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ABSTRACT
Smart Cities evolve into complex and pervasive urban environments with a citizens’ mandate to
meet sustainable development goals. Repositioning democratic values of citizens’ choices in these
complex ecosystems has turned out to be imperative in an era of social media filter bubbles, fake
news and opportunities for manipulating electoral results with such means. This paper introduces a
new paradigm of augmented democracy that promises actively engaging citizens in a more informed
decision-making augmented into public urban space. The proposed concept is inspired by a digital
revive of the Ancient Agora of Athens, an arena of public discourse, a Polis where citizens assem-
ble to actively deliberate and collectively decide about public matters. The core contribution of the
proposed paradigm is the concept of proving witness presence: making decision-making subject of
providing secure evidence and testifying for choices made in the physical space. This paper shows
how the challenge of proving witness presence can be tackled with blockchain consensus to empower
citizens’ trust and overcome security vulnerabilities of GPS localization. Moreover, a novel platform
for collective decision-making and crowd-sensing in urban space is introduced: Smart Agora. It is
shown how real-time collective measurements over citizens’ choices can be made in a fully decen-
tralized and privacy-preserving way. Witness presence is tested by deploying a decentralized system
for crowd-sensing the sustainable use of transport means. Furthermore, witness presence of cycling
risk is validated using official accident data from public authorities, which are compared against wis-
dom of the crowd. The paramount role of dynamic consensus, self-governance and ethically aligned
artificial intelligence in the augmented democracy paradigm is outlined.
1. Introduction
Smart City urban environments co-evolve to complex in-
formational ecosystems in which citizens’ collective deci-
sions have a tremendous impact on sustainable development.
Choices about which transport mean to use to decrease noise
levels or carbon emissions, which urban areas may require
gentrification or new policies for improving safety are some
examples in which decision-making turns out to be com-
plex and dynamic [111]. It is apparent that the 4-year elec-
toral agendas of political parties based on which they un-
fold their policies are either impractical or outdated for such
urban ecosystems. Policy-making, participation and ulti-
mately democracy requires a revisit and a digital transfor-
mation for the better of citizens.
Existing social media platforms, powered by citizens’
personal data and centralized machine learning algorithms
can isolate citizens via informational filters bubbles and ma-
nipulate them using fake information [126, 77]. Citizens of-
ten feel powerless to influence public matters and, beyond
elections, there is no established channel for their voice to
be heard in centers of decision-making [61]. Despite the
technological capabilities to engage wisdom of the crowd
for decision-making, decisions remain to a high extent top-
down and political actions do not always align with elec-
toral political agendas [62]. The rise of populism, extrem-
ism and electoral manipulations showcase the risks of demo-
cratic values in decay [56].
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To address these challenges a new digital paradigm of
augmented democracy is introduced to empower a more in-
formed, engaging and responsible decision-making augme-
nted into public urban space, where the decisions have a di-
rect impact. In this sense, augmented democracy is envi-
sioned as a digital revive of the Ancient Agora of Athens,
a public assembly of citizens for discourse, deliberation and
collective decisions-making. Witness presence has been so
far the missing but required value in digital democratic pro-
cesses: the act of intervening and testifying about the phys-
ical world as well as the undertaking of responsibility for
these actions. For instance, making the rating of traffic con-
gestion at different streets conditional to secure digital evi-
dence about the citizen’s location and speed records at these
streets is an example of proving witness presence. Validat-
ing such digital evidences without relying to a trusted third
party is a highly inter-disciplinary and complex challenge
involving research from the areas of distributed systems, se-
curity, Internet of Things, social science, mechanism design
and others [40, 106, 70, 58, 38].
The envisioned scenario is the following: Citizens nav-
igate over several urban points of interest with augmented in-
formation. Theymakemore informed and trustworthy choices
by proving witness presence in one of these points. They
also access live updates about the collective choices made
by other citizens in relevant points of interests. This pa-
per shows how this challenging scenario can be made tech-
nically feasible and viable using secure, privacy-preserving
and decentralized information systems, e.g. blockchain con-
sensus, as well as crypto-economic design principles to in-
centivize participation, engagement, while limiting adver-
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Augmented Democracy in Smart Cities
sary behavior. The proposed solution consists of the three
following pillars: (i) participatory crowd-sensing, (ii) proof
of witness presence and (iii) real-time collective measure-
ments. Despite the complexity and ambition level of the pro-
posed endeavor, this paper demonstrates a first prototyped
system (testnet) that integrates and deploys all three pillars.
It also illustrates a use case scenario on cycling safety that
validates the quality of information acquired via citizens’
witness presence using official data from public authorities.
The role that dynamic consensus, self-governance and artifi-
cial intelligence play in the proposed augmented democracy
paradigm is discussed.
Compared to related initiatives such as online petition/vo-
ting systems [48, 44], promising participatory budgeting ini-
tiatives for more equitable and transparent distribution of re-
sources [39] aswell as other e-participation approaches [134],
the proposed augmented democracy paradigm fundamentally
differs in the following aspects: (i) It does not rely on trusted
third parties. (ii) It can operate in real-time and is not limited
to long-term decision-making.(iii) It encourages a more in-
formed and responsible decision-making by better integrat-
ing citizens’ choices into daily life and public space. (iv) It
has a broader inter-disciplinary scope and applicability. In
summary, the contributions of this paper are outlined as fol-
lows:
• A new three-tier paradigm of augmented democracy
in Smart Cities.
• The Smart Agora crowd-sensing platform for model-
ing complex spatio-temporal crowd-sensing scenarios
of augmented decision-making.
• The new blockchain consensus concept ‘proof of wit-
ness presence’ and a study of how it is technically re-
alized.
• A review of related initiatives on digital democracy
as well as blockchain-based approaches for proof of
location.
• The concept and realization of ‘collective measure-
ments maps’ that filter out geolocated data and deter-
mine the points of interest from which data are aggre-
gated.
• Afirst fully-fleshedworking prototype of the augmented
democracy paradigm meeting minimal requirements
set for a proof of concept.
• A use case scenario on cycling safety demonstrating
the capacity of citizens’ witness presence to match ac-
curate information from official public authorities.
This paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 outlines the
theory and current practice behind digital democracy initia-
tives. Section 3 introduces the vision and challenges of the
augmented democracy paradigm that consists of three pil-
lars. The first pillar of participatory crowd-sensing is illus-
trated in Section 4. The concept of proving witness pres-
ence is introduced in Section 5 that is the second pillar of
the proposed paradigm. The third pillar of real-time collec-
tive measurements is introduced in Section 6. The evalu-
ation methodology and experimental results are illustrated
in Section 7. Section 8 discusses dynamic consensus and
self-governance as well as the role of artificial intelligence
for augmented democracy. Finally, Section 9 concludes this
paper and outlines future work.
2. Theoretical Underpinning and Related
Work
Political philosophers and democratic theorists have ar-
gued that delegating the ‘right of sovereignty’ could not be
democratic resulting in aristocracy as well as in non-political
and illegitimate state [123]. The proposed augmented democ-
racy approach suggests new pathways to diminish this del-
egation, and reclaim sovereignty at a local and community
level. The higher feasibility of a ‘renewed version of demo-
cratic representation’ based on ‘smaller, decentralized, and
distributed (offline and online) citizen assemblies’ is earlier
hypothesized as themeans to guarantee legitimacywhen rea-
ching mass participation is challenging [98, 35]. A more
localized scope in collective decision-making can also mit-
igate the trilemma of democratic reform [60]: among the
principles of political equality,mass participation and delib-
eration, promoting any of the two, hinders the third. In par-
ticular, the current online crowd-civic platforms can only ad-
dress highly engaged deliberators. As such they cannot rep-
resent well the broader population and, in this sense, guar-
antee political equality.
Earlier contemporary theory has also suggested that while
represented democracy is technically feasible, it remains an
oxymoron, in contrast to direct democracy that comes as
the norm but impractical [122]. A proposed horizontal and
acephalous political order suggests legislative power held
by multiple actors and functioning within elected and citi-
zen assemblies at multiple times and spaces. Citizens come
with both electoral rights and rights to revoke or censure
laws [51]. This approach aspires to reconcile sovereignty,
representation, and participationwith the latter settling a ‘sou-
rce of stability and innovation’, while representation is the
means to collect data and knowledge for public interest [95,
122]. New opportunities arise to experimentally test novel
radical ideas that have been so far approached by researchers
on amore theoretical basis, for instance, quadratic voting [74,
10] or a more egalitarian ranking aggregation of voting so-
lutions [52, 56].
Most research efforts on digital democracy focus on on-
line petitions, voting and the design of collaboration plat-
forms for deliberation and collective decision-making. For
instance, WeCollect [29] is a Swiss independent non-profit
platform that moderates networking of citizens, collects sig-
natures for popular initiatives and referendums including top-
ics such as refugees, basic income, energy policies and other.
Such efforts are also observed within the Zurich Political
Participation [24] portal that administrates online petitions
and self-initiatives published in newspapers. Such efforts
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based on online petitions fundamentally differ from the pro-
posed augmented democracy paradigm as they are not de-
signed for real-time feedback and interactions. Instead they
aim to increase participation into existing established demo-
cratic processes and provide new representation means to
various social groups.
CONSUL [4, 97] is an open-source citizens’ participa-
tion software that supports open, transparent and democratic
governance. The software supports debates, citizen propos-
als, participatory budgeting, voting and collaborative legis-
lation. CONSUL has been extensively used by city author-
ities and organizations all over the world with several local
projects featured online [4]. Further progress of such demo-
cratic initiatives in Spain has resulted in the open-source par-
ticipation solution of Decidim [8, 41] that configures partic-
ipation spaces such as initiatives, assemblies, processes and
consultations supported by face-to-face meetings, surveys,
proposals, voting and other. More specifically, the assem-
bly spaces provide the option of geolocating periodic meet-
ings, whose composition and agenda are self-organized by
participants. These two state-of-the-art platforms as well as
DemocracyOS [11] could benefit and work in synergy with
the proposed augmented democracy solution as it can posi-
tion more effectively collective decision-making in citizens’
daily life and the public space they experience.
There are other platforms with a narrower scope and fo-
cus. For instance, Crossiety [5] is a startupwith amobile app
implementing social networking functionality to connect lo-
cal communities and villages. Airesis [3] is an online de-
liberation tool that manages citizens’ shared proposals and
debates. It supports temporary anonymity, secret ballot, au-
ditable voting and the Schulze voting method [113]. De-
liberatorium [9] is designed to support crowds to deliberate
and have productive discussions about complex problems.
It combines argumentation theory and social computing in
a web-based system to promote dialogue, citizens’ retention
and engagement [68]. In contrast to the aforementioned de-
liberation and other engagement platforms [18, 12, 1], the
augmented democracy approach of this paper moves a step
forward by addressing quality aspects on collective decision-
making by empowering proof of claims and testimonies in
citizens’ choices.
Crowd-sensing and citizen science initiatives can also
provide insights and empirical evidence to policy makers.
For instance, Place Pulse [20, 55, 89, 111] is a platform for
mapping andmeasuring quantitatively urban qualities in cities
as perceived by citizens. Such qualities include howwealthy,
modern, safe, lively, active, unique, central, adaptable or
family friendly an urban space is. Another environmental
initiative is CrowdWater [6, 114] that is designed to collect
data about the water level, soil moisture and temporary stre-
ams to predict floods and water flows. None of the above ini-
tiatives is designed for direct online decision-making, never-
theless, the domain data they harvest can be used as empiri-
cal evidence in the proposed augmented democracy paradigm.
Finally, blockchain solutions for participatory and demo-
cratic processes are subject of active research [106, 115, 10].
Agora [2] and Follow My Vote [16] rely on a decentralized
voting protocol and consensus mechanism to establish se-
cure and transparent ballots as well as voting results that
are publicly verifiable. Democracy Earth [10] focuses on a
censorship-resistant social layer on top of distributed ledgers.
It runs intersubjective consensus [127] that uses social mark-
ers to incentivize participation on the blockchain economy
and earn rights. The system is designed to deploy border-
less democracies, universal basic income mechanisms and
credit scores, without the need to sacrifice privacy. Vote-
tandem [28] is based on blockchain technology with which
Swiss citizens can supply their vote to inhabitants in Switzer-
land excluded from voting, e.g. foreigners making up 25%
of the population. However such voting solutions have not
yet integrated in the public urban space and do not focus on
a higher situation awareness in collective decision-making.
3. Augmented Democracy: Vision and
Challenges
This paper envisions a digital revive of the ancient agora
of Athens, a public cyber-physical arena of discourse, where
citizens actively assemble, deliberate and engage in informed
collective decision-making about a wide range of complex
public matters. The scenario envisioned is the following:
Individual citizens, regional communities or policy makers
crowd-source complex decision-making processes augmented
into Smart Cities, for instance, decide how to better inte-
grate immigrants, how to improve public safety or transport
means, how to deal with gentrification and others. Such pro-
cesses are designed to encourage or even enforce a more in-
formed and participatory decision-making to improve indi-
vidual/collective awareness and the quality of decision out-
comes. In practice this means that a citizen with a commu-
nity mandate to participate in a collective decision-making
process uses a smart phone and navigates in the urban en-
vironment to visit or discover points of interests with aug-
mented information. For instance, after a natural disaster,
i.e. flooding, earthquake, etc., citizens can rate the severity
of damages at different locations to orchestratemitigation ac-
tions more effectively. Citizens have a saying, an informed
one, backed up by evidence ofwitness presence in the cyber-
physical space of Smart Cities. Witness presence is an added
value on citizens’ decision-making created at a certain loca-
tion, at certain timewith a certain situation awarenesswhen
performing a certain action. Such evidence-based collec-
tive decision-making process introduces highly contextuali-
zed spatio-temporal data, whose aggregation creates a live
pulse of the city, a public good created by citizens, for citi-
zens. For instance, live updates about the severity of dam-
ages in certain areas can engage remote volunteers for sup-
port or act as warning signals for civilians to avoid these ar-
eas and protect their life.
Such a scenario of a direct augmented democracy in Smart
Cities requires data-intensive information systems playing a
key role for the viability and trust of this challenging en-
deavor. A centralized design for these critical systems can
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pose several undermining risks: (i) Existing centrally man-
aged online social media, along with traditional media, are
often carriers of unaccountable and uncredible information
that is a result of manipulative nudging and spreading of fake
news [126, 77]. The damage in the participation level and
trust of citizens on democratic processes, such as elections
and referendums, can be unprecedented [78, 63]. (ii) The
most prominent global localization service, the GPS, is cen-
trally controlled, it has several security and privacy vulner-
abilities, i.e. spoofing and jamming [120], it is not accurate
enough and has restricted coverage, e.g. indoor localization
is not feasible [93]. (iii) Collectivemeasurements and aware-
ness via Big Data analytics rely on trusted third parties that
are single point of failure. They usually collect and store
personal sensitive data and as a result profiling and discrim-
inatory actions over citizens become feasible.
This paper claims that in principle any digital democ-
racy paradigm cannot remain viable in the long term unless
themanagement of information systems is democratized. As
democracies cannot properly function even with benevolent
totalitarian forces, similarly, centralized information systems
for governance, however well they perform and simple to
manage, they can always be subject ofmanipulation andmis-
use in such a critical service for society.
The positioning of this paper is that decentralized infor-
mation systems, particularly distributed ledgers, consensus
mechanisms and crypto-economic models, can by used to
design amore informed and participatory collective decision-
making as shown within the three pillars of Figure 1. This is
possible by introducing the concept of witness presence as a
consensus model for verifying location and situation aware-
ness of collective decision-making in Smart Cities.
Each pillar involves a technical challenge addressed in
this paper: (i) How to design a general-purpose crowd-sensing
system for the Internet of Things to reason about the qual-
ity of decision-making in public space. (ii) How collective
decision-making can bemade conditional of provingwitness
presence using blockchain consensus to empower trust. (iii)
How to access real-time spatio-temporal collective measure-
ments made in decentralized and privacy-preserving way as
a result of witness presence. The rest of this paper illustrates
each of the three pillars in the proposed framework of aug-
mented democracy.
4. Participatory Crowd-sensing
At the foundations of the framework lies the award-win-
ning1 platform of Smart Agora, a pillar that empowers citi-
zens to (i) visually design and crowd-source complex decision-
making processes augmented in the urban environment as
well as (ii) make more informed decisions by witnessing the
urban environment for which decisions are made. Figure 2
outlines how an augmented democracy project is modeled2.
Decision-making processes are designed in a visual and
1Smart Agora has been part of the Empower Polis project that won the
1st prize at the ETH Policy Challenge [14].
2The modeled entities follow the concept of Hive [17].
Figure 1: An augmented democracy paradigm for Smart Cities
consisting of three pillars: (i) Crowd-sensing is performed
within participatory witness presence scenarios of augmented
reality in public spaces. (ii) Proof of witness presence is per-
formed by securely verifying the location and the situation
awareness of citizens without revealing privacy-sensitive infor-
mation. (iii) Real-time and privacy-preserving collective mea-
surements are performed, subject of witness presence.
Figure 2: Modeling a crowd-sensing project with Smart Agora.
A project consists of one or more assets, tasks, and assign-
ments. (i) An asset defines complex crowd-sensing processes
and consists of configurations about the point of interests, the
questions and the collected sensor data. (ii) A task stores and
manages the collected citizens’ data as defined by an asset.
(iii) An assignment links together an asset and a task and
launches the crowd-sensing process by selecting candidate cit-
izens for participation. In this visual example, Task 1 results
in crowd-sensing data from the Assignment 1 of Asset 1 to a
sample of the population. In contrast, Task 2 is the result of
Assignment 2 of Asset 1 to a different population sample as
well as Assignment 3 of Asset 2 to the whole population.
interactive way as follows: A number of points of interest
are determined in an interactive map as shown in Figure 3a.
Each point of interest hosts a number of questions3 that citi-
zens can answer on their smart phone if and only if they are
localized nearby the point of interest (see Figure 3b). An el-
lipse [64] with configurable size is determined around each
moving citizen. Localization is performed when a point of
interest falls in the ellipse, triggering an event that prompts
citizens to answer questions on their smart phone based on
what they witness in the public urban space they are located
3Radio, checkbox, likert and text box questions are currently supported.
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(a) Determining augmented point of interests with survey questions.
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Figure 33: Smart Agora- Questio
(b) The Smart Agora App
Figure 3: The Smart Agora software platform.
that moment.
Points of interest can be given by an oracle [82, 84],
i.e. a policy maker running a specific voting campaign, or
they can be crowd-sourced to communities based on crypro-
economic incentive models. For instance, FOAM [30] relies
on token curated registries [107, 58] that realize economic
and reputation incentives for citizens to play the role of car-
tographers and contextualize crypto-spatial coordinates4 with
meta-information.
Each question as well as their possible answers can be
incentivized with rewards in the form of different crypto-
currencies, i.e. utility tokens used for a value exchange re-
quired to run and incentivize the augmented democracy pa-
radigm. For instance, tokens created by a city council to
incentivize participation in a crowd-sensing project for im-
proving the quality of public transport can be collected and
used by citizens to purchase public transport tickets. Simi-
larly parking away from crowded city centers can be incen-
tivized with tokens that can issue discounts in nearby shops.
Sensor data can also be periodically collected and used for
supporting the two above pillars in Figure 1, i.e. sensor fu-
sion to prove claims of witness presence [129] or aggrega-
tion measurements over sensor data can be performed to in-
crease collective awareness [102].
A decision-making process can be designed in three nav-
4On-chain and off-chain verifiable location information of FOAM con-
sisting of a geohash and an Ethereum smart contract address. It can approx-
imate resolution of one square meter that allows a maximum of 500 trillion
unique addresses.
igation modalities: (i) Arbitrary–the points of interests can
be arbitrary visited by citizens. Questions are always trig-
gered whenever citizens visit a new point of interest. (ii) Se-
quential–A sequence is determined for visiting the points of
interests. Only the questions of the next point of interest can
be triggered, imposing in this way an order. (iii) Interactive–
The next point of interest is determined by the answer of the
citizen in the current point of interest. The latter modality
can serve more complex decision-making processes as well
as gamification scenarios.
5. Proof of Witness Presence
Witness presence provides an added value in participa-
tory decision-making [75, 91]. Witnessing public happen-
ings and the complex urban environment of Smart Cities
empowers a Polis of active citizens that can directly influ-
ence real-world by intervening and testifying instead of re-
maining passive spectators of a reality for which others de-
cide, a limitation of current representative democracies. Ul-
timately, witness presence is about encouraging the taking of
responsibility on spot, a requirement for a viable democracy.
While witness presence can be seen as a political statement,
it is actually a highly complex techno-socio-economic prob-
lem in the context of the proposed augmented democracy
paradigm: Proving of being present at a certain location,
at a certain time with a certain situation awareness in or-
der to perform certain actions, while having the incentive to
participate. Section 5.1 and 5.2 review blockchain consen-
sus models for location proofs and social proofs respectively.
Section 5.3 also illustrates their synthesis into a blockchain
consensus network for proving witness presence.
5.1. A review on proof of location
At the core of witness presence lies proof of location that
is the secure verification of a citizen’s spatial position. It re-
quires accurate estimation of distances or angles of signals
exchanged betweenwireless transmitting devices. These dis-
tances are calculated by measuring signal attenuation or sig-
nal propagation times. Techniques of the former, i.e. Re-
ceived Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) [88], are common
but do not provide accurate estimates, while techniques of
the latter, i.e. Time of Flight (ToF) with algorithms based
on triangulation, trilateration or multilateration, require syn-
chronized clocks to eliminate clock drifts of the oscillators [50].
For example, the Global Positioning System (GPS) relies on
high-precision atomic clocks on satellites that synchronize
with centralized master control stations on the ground. Re-
cently, decentralized algorithms for Byzantine fault-tolerant
clock synchronization have been studied [85, 72]. These al-
gorithms run by autonomous interactive wireless receivers
and transmitters, i.e. beacons, that self-determine via their
communication the geometry of their zone coverage with-
out third parties. By reaching an agreement about a com-
mon time5, specific locations can be accurately detected via
trilateration [86].
5Not necessarily a UTC time unless some oracle information is used.
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Table 1
A comparison of blockchain-based approaches for proof of location based on criteria that
can make the augmented democracy paradigm more viable.
Approaches GPS [93] Mobile Cellular Network [125] LPWAN [30] P2P Ad Hoc Networks [40]
Infrastructure-independent No No No Yes
Decentralization Low Low Medium High
Access Open Closed Open Open
Management Governmental-level Enterprise-level Community-level Self-organized
Disaster Resilience Medium Medium Medium High
Coverage Range Global National Urban Localized
Indoor Coverage No Yes Yes Yes
The proof of location required for the proof of witness
presence can be achieved with various trade-offs using one
or more of the following infrastructures: (i) GPS, (ii) mo-
bile cellular network, (iii) low power wide area network (LP-
WAN) and (iv) peer-to-peer ad hoc (opportunistic) networks
consisting of several different Internet of Things devices such
as smart phones, static beacons, wearables, wireless access
points, etc. Table 1 summarizes a comparison of the block-
chain-based approaches for proof of location.
On the one hand, GPS is a free service with planetary
coverage and as such it can be easily used by a Smart Agora
application for outdoor localization, as the current proto-
type supports. Similarly, GeoCoin relies on GPS for the
location-based execution of smart contracts [93]. However,
GPS is a single point of failure, it is highly susceptible to
fraud, spoofing, jamming and cyber-attacks, it does not pro-
vide any proof of origin or authentication and therefore it is
unreliable by itself to prove claims of locations. Moreover,
GPS cannot provide indoor localization, it underperforms in
high density urban environments, i.e. increased signal mul-
tipath, and its energy consumption is prohibitive for low-
power devices. Such vulnerabilities have been prominently
identified in smart watches6 as well as in military cyber-
attacks affecting thousands of civilian ships [31]. Despite
these limitations, there is active research on building secure
and privacy-preserving localization solutions based on GPS
by introducing additional protocol and security mechanisms,
for instance, GPS-based active crowd localization based on
digital signatures and bulletin boards applied for tracking
lost items [34, 131].
Mobile cellular network providers have been earlier pro-
posed to act as oracles to submit positioning information to
smart contracts that verify whether such positions are in-
cluded into virtual borders referred to as geofences [125].
Such geofences are represented by location encoding sys-
tems, for instance, Geohash and S2, that are hierarchical, i.e.
they can model different cells at different resolution level. A
geofence can be used by a local community to self-regulate
6Such vulnerabilities have been demonstrated by a German security re-
searcher after a smart watch vendor ignored vulnerability reports for more
than a year, leaving thousands of GPS-tracking watches open to attack-
ers [19].
its (i) decision-making territory and (ii) crypto-economic ac-
tivity resulting from the incentivized participation in decision-
making. The former determines the validation territory of
witness presence claims. The latter determines the geographic
areas in which transactions are permitted with collected to-
kens. For instance, Platin aspires to support such crypto-
currencies for humanitarian aid use cases [32]. To control
transaction costs for the execution of smart contracts, local-
ization can be performed with different schemes: at regular
time or distance intervals, on demand or upon violation of a
citizen’s presence in a geofence. Localization viamobile cel-
lular networks can only though take place within the covered
area of the mobile operator and global coverage requires spe-
cial roaming service and collaboration between differentmo-
bile network operators. An alternative approach to overcome
this limitation is to allow cellular towers of any mobile net-
work to provide secure location services for the blockchain.
Such an approach is earlier introduced. It involves cellular
towers with a well defined location that issue location cer-
tificates and participate in mining location proofs. Trust is
achieved using cryptographically signed IP packets [54].
An alternative infrastructure to the proprietary and closed
networks of mobile operators is the use of Low Power Wide
Area Networks that allow access to an unlicensed radio spec-
trum [108]. LPWANprovide the following alternative trade-
offs: long range, low power operation at the expense of low
data rate and high latency. For instance, The Things Net-
work [26] builds a global open LoRaWAN network of 7231
gateways in 137 cities run by local self-organized commu-
nities providing extensive coverage in urban environments.
FOAM intends to use this decentralized open infrastructure
for secure location verification enforced by smart contract
safety deposits. Proof of location is performed within a zone
(community operator) defined by at least four zone author-
ities (radio gateways) each managing a number of zone an-
chors (radio beacons). A zone anchor is a device with a ra-
dio transmitter, a local clock and a public key. It is capable
of engaging in a Byzantine fault-tolerant clock synchroniza-
tion protocol [85]. Zone anchors perform triangulations and
verify claims of presence via authentication certificates that
are fraud proof. A zone authority is a node with an Internet
connection that determines whether the zone anchors are in
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sync.
All of the above solutions among others [69, 71, 80] re-
quire additional special infrastructure. Mobile cellular net-
works and LPWANmay be unavailable or underperformimg
in cases of natural disasters and unpredictable high-density
mobility patters. In these scenarios, an alternative infrastru-
cture-independent and decentralized approach is the use of
peer-to-peer ad hoc (opportunistic) networks formed by self-
organized citizens’ devices running decentralized secure pro-
tocols based on blockchain proof of stake consensus mech-
anisms [40]. Proofs of location are performed between wit-
nesses and a prover, whose Bluetooth interactions verify the
identities of the involved devices as well as whether the lo-
cation claims of each device are reachable within the ra-
dio coverage supported by the communication technology
of the devices. Spatio-temporal mobility patterns of users
may influence the verification process and additional mea-
sures of verification may be required, for instance, analysis
of betweeness in pseudonym correlation graphs [132] or so-
cial tracking distance metrics [131]. Periodically changing
the device identifiers according to a Poisson distribution pre-
vents the reveal of real identities by observing location proof
records [132].
5.2. Situation awareness and proving witnessing
A few blockchain approaches combine network-basedwith
social-based proof of location [83, 32, 129]. For instance,
on-chain location claims at Platin consist of a public key and
a proof of correctness. In practice this is the output of one
out several locally executed algorithms that validate location
information based on the following three security pillars: (i)
sensor fusion, (ii) behavior over time and (iii) peer-to-peer
witnessing. Sensor fusion relies on multiple sources of sen-
sor data, i.e. GPS, wireless access points, cell tower and
Bluetooth oracles, for validation of location claims. Behav-
ior over time reasons about any behavioral anomaly that in-
dicates spoofing. Data-driven verification can be localized
to preserve privacy by design and prevent turning proofs of
witness presence to surveillance actions that can actually un-
dermine and manipulate democratic processes [65]. Peer-to-
peer witnessing using ad hoc opportunistic networks can be
used as an additional counter-measure to testify for attackers
that may replay sensor fusion or report fake behavior over
time.
Proofs of witness presence verify the situation awareness
required for a more informed collective decision-making.
For instance, assume a crowd-sensing collective movement
for a spatio-temporal safety assessment of bike riding in a
city. Citizens rate the safety of different points of interests
in the city based on which new data-driven policies can be
designed to encourage the further safe use of bikes and the
improvement of the infrastructure, i.e. new bike lanes. Mak-
ing safety rating on the points of interest subject of prov-
ing witness presence can potentially improve the rating qual-
ity and as a result the effectiveness of a new designed pol-
icy. Beyond citizens proving their location, proving bike
riding experience, on spot or elsewhere, indicates a situa-
tion awareness with an added value and a higher potential for
a more effective policy. Verification can be performed on-
chain or off-chain using witnesses, sensor fusion, i.e. anal-
ysis of GPS/accelerometer data, or even oracles, i.e. a bike
sharing operator.
Other means to verify witness presence include the fol-
lowing: Contextual QR codes [109], challenge questions,
puzzles and CAPTCHA-like tests [22], whose solutions re-
quire information mined at the point of interests. In addition,
collaborative social challenges [43, 36] between citizens are
means to introduce social proofs based on social psychol-
ogy as well as community trust for protection against social
engineering attacks [112]. Moreover, communities can also
institutionalize their own digital witnesses based on privacy-
preserving forensic techniques introduced in the context of
blockchain [121, 92].
5.3. Blockchain and consensus network
Figure 4 illustrates the blockchain-based Internet of Things
architecture with which witness presence claims are veri-
fied. The architecture is a layered one, starting from the
physical public space where localization in points of inter-
est is performed by wireless beacons using solutions such
as the ones reviewed in Table 1. Proofs of location can be
augmented with one or more layers of social proofs using
methods outlined in Section 5.2. Full nodes with compu-
tational power and an Internet connection participate in the
consensus network to further verify and cross-check the ad-
herence to protocol rules across the local nodes at each point
of interest. Verified witness presence claims are written to
the blockchain. They are a result of location proofs, so-
cial proofs and protocol adherence proofs performed over
the layered architecture.
The properties of blockchain consensus for proving wit-
ness presence are outlined as follows: (i) Validator set: The
validators of presence claims depend on the adopted approach
from Table 1. For instance, approaches such as LPWAN
and Peer-to-peer (P2P) Ad Hoc networks that rely on dis-
tributed networks of wireless beacons determine their val-
idator set based on their physical distance. Communication
constrained by physics result allows the validators in close
physical proximity to verify location claims around a point of
interest [70]. This set of validators can be further expanded
with nodes for proof of stake. Such nodes hold a public key
and stake a deposit token to validate social proofs. (ii) Val-
idator weight: The number of staked tokens can be used as
a weight. However, other (reputation) criteria related to the
level of participation and democracy could be engaged [128,
79, 57]: to what extent a geographic region decides public
matters via witness presence, the level of legitimacy of wit-
ness presence in a region, and other. (iii) Validator criteria:
Proof of work solves a cryptographic puzzle that verifies the
validity of a block (its nonce number) when its hash value
is lower than a difficulty threshold: sha(nonce)<difficulty.
In contrast, proof of witness presence requires matching the
signature to the validator set, meeting the minimum stake
requirement and having no slashing conditions, e.g. Byzan-
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Figure 4: A blockchain-based Internet of Things architecture
for proving witness presence. Points of interest in an urban
physical space can be determined by the transmission cover-
age zone of wireless beacons that act as secure location ser-
vice providers using triangulation and Byzantine fault-tolerant
clock synchronization [85]. Presence claims can be further
supported by social proofs on spot that verify the situation
awareness of citizens in collective decision-making. Witness
presence claims are further verified in a blockchain consensus
network that consists of (full) nodes with Internet connection.
They verify whether the rules for location and social proofs are
fulfilled. Location accuracy can be traced and checks for fraud
can be performed, for instance, comparing location claims from
different adjacent points of interest to verify whether clocks are
actually in sync. Verified witness presence claims are finally
written to the blockchain based on which a more responsible
participation in collective decision-making can be authorized.
tine fault-tolerant clock synchronization is successfully per-
formed for proving presence claims [85]. Verification rules
for robust spatio-temporal data can be further engaged here [90,
47]. (iv) Validator verifiability: For presence claims, signed
receipts of all clock synchronization messages received and
synced to the chain are required. The limits of transmission
coverage restrict the receipt of such messages from valida-
tors within the proximity of a point of interest [70]. Social
proofs require keeping the chain synced to verify that other
validators have staked and belong to the validator set.
In terms of the crypto-economic incentive model, a util-
ity token [42] can be used to reward (i) citizens and commu-
nities for introducing localization infrastructure for location
proofs, (ii) the establishment of social proofs in points of
interests for proving social claims, or (iii) the use computa-
tional resources for validation of the witness presence claims
in the consensus network. The rewards include minted new
tokens and transaction fees according to the protocol rules
enforced by the network itself that punishes adverse behav-
ior. In all these cases, permissionless participation requires
staking that is the commit of a deposit token value, while
faults resulting in violations of the protocol rules (slashing
conditions) result in penalties. These are usually magni-
tudes higher than the anticipated short term rewards. There-
fore, the entry cost, existence cost and exit penalty can make
proofs of witness presence resistant to Sybil attacks [96, 90,
47]. Note that citizens who make witness presence claims
require to pay a fee to witness presence service providers
of the local community7 in the same utility token, another
token or fiat money. These fees reward the further develop-
ment and maintenance of the infrastructure, i.e. supporting
witness presence in new points of interest, improving the
localization accuracy, increasing the bandwidth allocation,
augmenting further the points of interest with social proofs,
etc. Citizens may have a self-interest to reward such partici-
patory processes directly from their own funds as the means
to improve direct democracy and give themselves a stronger
voice on public matters. Such funds may also originate by
state authorities incentivized to improve the legitimacy of
collective decision-making in the same way that such funds
are reserved for conducting elections, e.g. running voting
centers. In other words, witness presence turns points of in-
terests into are a new type of digital voting centers for aug-
mented decision-making available at any time and location.
The transaction costs of proving witness presence claims
are dependent on mobility patterns and the density of the
witness presence claims made by citizens at each point of
interest. They also depend on the available radio beacons
covering a point of interest as such devices have physical
constraints on the rate of messages they can process. The
feasibility of permissionless Byzantine consensus protocols
to operate in real-time over wireless networks is recently
demonstrated [70]. Benchmark measurements of transac-
tion latency are available in earlier work based on which
the choice of inter-block time, the number of confirmation
blocks and process-level changes can be tuned [130]. Smart
contracts can be designed to load-balance transaction costs
between location proofs and social proofs: within a large
crowd concentrated on a point of interest, social proofs may
prove to be more reliable that location proofs made by over-
loaded radio beacons. Moreover, further performance im-
provements can be achieved via a hierarchical Plasma design
7These are the nodes performing the localization and the social proofs.
Therefore, no service fee needs to be payed to a central authority.
E. Pournaras: Preprint submitted to Elsevier Page 8 of 19
Augmented Democracy in Smart Cities
that splits the blockchain into parent-child chains [99, 133,
15]. A child chain is constructed for each point of interest
running synchronous consensus for clock synchronization.
In contrast, a parent chain holds the staked tokens and the
smart contracts that represent the different child chains. The
parent chain may rely on an asynchronous consensus net-
work in Ethereum such as Nakamoto in the case of proof of
work or Casper in case of proof of stake [76, 15, 42].
A self-sovereign identity management system [94] can
be used to authenticate citizens’ actions in the proposed per-
missionless distributed ledger, i.e. verifying the actual citi-
zen who issued a witness presence claim to prevent double
participation that can influence the result of collective deci-
sions [73]. Moreover, the information provided to the smart
contracts for social proofs can be further used formulti-factor
authentication [110, 33, 116]. Identity management services
do not need to rely on third parties and several such ser-
vices are earlier proposed and reviewed [81]. In particular,
UniquID [27] is an identity and access management service
for the Internet of Things that is open-source, permission-
less and relies on Ethereum [81]. LifeID is another self-
sovereign digital identity platform with which citizens con-
trol all transactions that require authentication of their iden-
tity without the need for third-party corporations or govern-
ment agencies. Zero-knowledge proofs are applied and the
minimum data required for verification are shared [124].
6. Real-time Collective Measurements
Real-time collective measurements are the aggregation
of citizens’ crowd-sensing data, e.g. decisions, made as a
result of witness presence. The computation of aggrega-
tion functions, e.g. summation, mean, max, min, standard
deviation, are some examples of such collective measure-
ments. They can be used as follows: Citizens receive real-
time crowd-sensing information. A collective awareness is
built that is used as live feedback for future crowd-sensing
decisions, i.e. the feedback loop in Figure 1. Collective
measurements may encourage or discourage witness pres-
ence, for instance, a warning system that guides authorities
to mitigate a physical disaster in certain points of interest,
while citizens are instructed to avoid dangerous ones.
A transparent and reliable system for collective measure-
ments is paramount for building collective awareness and
trust among citizens, both required for a viable augmented
democracy paradigm. Existing centralized polls and social
media often fail to provide reliable and trustworthy infor-
mation and are often subject of citizens’ profiling over col-
lected personal data, nudging and political manipulation [59,
126, 77]. Instead, the computations required for aggrega-
tion can be crowd-sourced to citizens using their personal
devices or computational resources of communities in a sim-
ilar fashion as the diaspora* social network [45] or Scuttle-
butt [23, 118]. Although decentralized computations for ag-
gregation are more privacy-preserving by design using dif-
ferential privacy and homomorphic encryption techniques,
their accuracy requires significant self-adaptations to cope
with the following: (i) continuous data streams as a result of
changes in decision-making, (ii) a varying spatio-temporal
participation level as well as (iii) (Byzantine) failures.
The relevance of these challenges in the augmented democ-
racy paradigm is the following: Citizens revisiting a point
of interest in the future may reevaluate an urban quality trig-
gering recomputations of the aggregation functions to reflect
changes on the input crowd-sensing data. The decision of a
citizen updates the aggregation functions as long as witness
presence is proved. If witness presence cannot be verified
anymore, corrective rollback operations on the aggregation
functions are performed to reflect the latest status of partic-
ipation. Similarly, any failure that cannot guarantee a cor-
rect execution of the aggregation protocol shall be treated
as a failure to verify witness presence and therefore, correc-
tive operationswith rollback operations are performed in this
case as well. In summary: collective measurements provide
a live pulse of a crowd, whose localization at points of inter-
est is verified for witness presence.
A possible feasible decentralized approach to realize this
ambitious concept is the use of DIAS, the Dynamic Intelli-
gent Aggregation Service [7, 102]. DIAS is a network of in-
terconnected agents deployed in citizens’ personal devices or
in computational resources of regional communities around
points of interest. Agents perform a gossip-based commu-
nication to disseminate crowd-sensing data used as input in
aggregation functions computed locally by each agent. The
agents of DIAS are self-adaptive and can update the aggre-
gates in an automated way when input data change as well
as when agents join, leave or fail [100, 101]. They have this
capability by reasoning based on historic data in a privacy-
preserving way. Reasoning relies on a distributed memory
system that consists of probabilistic data structures, the Bloom
filters [102]. In simple words and practical terms, the mem-
ory system can reasonwhether the choice a citizen has changed
at a point of interest. It can also reason on whether a citizen
visits again or leaves a point of interest. Further technical
information about DIAS is out of the scope of this paper and
readers are referred to earlier work [102, 100, 101].
Collective measurements can bemade conditional to dif-
ferent witness presence scenarios that are referred to as col-
lective measurements maps. Two types of such measure-
ments maps are introduced as an illustrative example: (i)
distributed and (ii) localized.
In the distributedmeasurementsmaps, aggregation func-
tions receive the input data of citizens, who prove witness
presence in one out of several possible points of interest.
In other words, a logical disjunction (OR) determines the
proof of witness presence at one possible point of interest as
the required condition to participate in the collective mea-
surements. This measurements map is relevant for federated
democratic processes of regional communities, for instance
collective decision-making in the spatial context of multi-
ple university campuses, i.e. an ‘eduroam’ version of aug-
mented democracy. Figure 5a-5d illustrate the augmented
democracy paradigm with a distributed measurements map.
In localized measurements map, aggregation functions
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(a) A snapshot of citizens moving around with their smart phones
to visit augmented points of interest.
(b) Each point of interest has a verified number of citizens proving
their witness presence.
(c) Citizens are interconnected in a decentralized network of gossip-
based communication over which collective measurements, i.e. data
aggregation, can be performed.
(d) Collective measurements are exclusively performed between the
citizens with a proof of witness presence.
(e) Regional community A (f) Regional community B (g) Regional community C (h) Regional community D
Figure 5: An illustration of the augmented democracy paradigm. Distributed measurements map in Figure 5a-5d: Collective
measurements are performed by proving witness presence at one out of several possible points of interest. Localized measurements
map in Figure 5e-5h: multiple localized collective measurements are performed by proving witness presence at a certain point of
interest.
receive citizens’ input data by proving witness presence at a
certain point of interest. This measurements map is relevant
for local regional communities that use their own compu-
tational resources to run their own collective measurements
and make them available to their local citizens. Figure 5e-
5h show an example. For each point of interest, aggregation
is restricted between the localized citizens proving witness
presence.
The two proposed collective measurements maps are not
the only options and more complex witness presence logic
can be designed. For instance, semantic collective measure-
ments can run by two DIAS networks aggregating crowd-
sensing data at points of interest corresponding to (i) tram
stations and (ii) bus stations respectively.
The communication complexity of such real-time collec-
tive measurements exclusively depends on the updates of the
input data in the aggregation functions. Such updates are
triggered by (i) changes of the input data and (ii) join and
leaves of nodes in the network that result in new input data
or data removals. The influence of such updates in the ag-
gregation accuracy is studied in earlier work [102, 100, 101].
In the augmented democracy paradigm, the following fac-
tors influence the trigger of such updates: (i) A higher num-
ber and density of the points of interest in which witness
presence can be verified (joins/leaves) is likely to cause a
higher number of input data updates and as a result higher
communication cost. This is especially the case for the dis-
tributed measurements maps. (ii) The citizens’ mobility pat-
terns over the points of interests. More frequent witness
presence claims in the different points of interest result in
higher communication cost.
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7. Evaluation Methodology and Results
Evaluating the end-to-end integrated functionality of the
whole augmented democracy paradigm illustrated in Sec-
tion 3 is a challenging endeavor. This requires a rigorous
extensive evaluation of each proposed pillar that is subject
of active ongoing work [104]. Such detailed evaluation does
not fall within the scope and objectives of this paper. To
overcome the aforementioned challenge and come with a
very first proof of concept, a simple yet fully-fleshed ex-
perimental testnet scenario is designed with the following
requirements: (i) A realistic Smart City use case for par-
ticipatory crowd-sensing. (ii) Proof of witness presence in
two points of interest based on GPS. (iii) Real-time collec-
tive measurements in distributed measurements maps over
a small crowd of test users with different realistic mobility
patterns.
Moreover, the quality of information collected based on
citizens’ witness presence is validated using empirical offi-
cial data from public authorities. More specifically, an ap-
plication scenario of cycling safety in Zurich is studied, in
which the perception of bike riders about the cycling safety
in different urban spots is compared to an empirical safety
model built using official data of the Federal Roads Office
collected from Swiss GeoAdmin [25, 49]. If the two safety
estimations match, then this is indication that witness pres-
ence in participatory crowd-sensing can indeed provide in-
formation quality comparable to the official but costly data
collection methods.
7.1. Experimental testnet scenario
A testnet scenario on sustainable transport usage is in-
troduced to address the first requirement for a proof of con-
cept. The testnet scenario ran for about one hour on 3.6.2019
between 13:00-14:00 in Zurich. The goal of the testnet sce-
nario is to assess the preferred transport mean with which
citizens visit a place they witness. Such a use case is relevant
to transport engineers, who work with travel diaries. While
travel diaries are modeled based on traditional, costly and in-
frequent survey questions, the pervasiveness of the Internet
of Things promises new opportunities for more realistic and
real-time data collection based on which future traffic flow
models can rely on [53, 105]. Similarly, city councils can es-
tablish new policies and incentives for citizens to make use
of more sustainable transport means.
This use case assumes a linear model of sustainability
over six transport means: 0. Car, 1. Bus, 2. Train, 3. Tram,
4. Bike, 5. Walking. These transport means are common
in Zurich and usually a destination can be reached fast with
several different transport means. Car comes with the mini-
mum sustainability value of zero, while walking comes with
the maximum sustainability of 5. Although this linear model
is an oversimplification over several involved sustainability
aspects such as environment, health, safety, social and other,
it is intuitive and straightforward to engage test users as well
as interpretable. Therefore, the purpose of the use case is to
serve the realism of the testnet scenario rather than collect-
ing use case data for a rigorous analysis.
(a) Localization. (b) Aggregation.
Figure 6: Assessing the preferred transport mean to reach a
witnessed point of interest in terms of sustainability. Localiza-
tion triggers a question followed by live collective measuments
received from other test users localized to other points of in-
terest.
The second requirement is met by designing a decision-
making process in Smart Agora for the testnet scenario. The
test users make a choice via a likert scale question that pops
up in the Smart Agora app when they are localized at a point
of interest as shown in Figure 6a. Such a question is part
of six crowd-sensing Smart Agora assets created for six test
users, who are equally split into two groups.
To meet the third requirement, each crowd-sensing as-
set is designed in the sequential navigational modality with
two points of interest visited in reversed order among the
two groups to assess the distributed measurements maps of
DIAS, i.e. choices of test users are aggregated in real-time
from two different remote points of interest. Figure 7 il-
lustrates the designed experimental scenario. Note that the
depicted walking path is the calculated Google Maps path
rather than the one that test users followed8. The actual
traces collectedwith Smart Agorawithin the localization cir-
cles are shown in Figure 10 of Appendix A.
To make sure that multiple test users are localized si-
multaneously in different points of interest, a requirement
to evaluate the distributed measurements maps, a common
starting point is chosen, the building of the Chair of Com-
putational Social Science at ETHZurich, which falls in close
proximity between the two points of interest: (i)ZurichHaupt-
bahnhof that is the main station of the Zurich city center
and (ii) ETH Zurich Hauptgebaüde that is the main build-
ing of ETH Zurich. Both groups start their navigation at the
same time, i.e. mimicking two swarms. This makes the par-
8Group 1 has followed a shortcut on the way to ETH Zurich Hauptge-
baüde by using the Polybahn [21].
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Figure 7: An overview of the testnet scenario: Two groups
each with three test users visit in reversed order the two point
of interests of (i) Zurich Hauptbahnhof and (ii) ETH Zurich
Hauptgebaüde starting from Stampfenbachstrasse 48, 8092,
Zurich, where the Chair of Computational Social Science of
ETH Zurich is situated. Group 1 (Orange) visits first Zurich
Hauptbahnhof and Group 2 (purple) visits first ETH Zurich
Hauptgebaüde. Each unique localization to one of the points of
interest triggers for a test user a question for assessing sustain-
able transport usage. While a test user remains localized, live
collective measurements among all other localized test users
are received. The three nested circles around each point of
interest visualize the three different ranges of localization that
each group member has: 50, 100 and 150 meters.
ticipation of the test users in the experimental process sim-
pler. However, this localization synchronicity is an undesir-
able experimental artifact as in reality mobility patterns dif-
fer among citizens. To limit the synchronicity effect, each
user has a localization circle with different radius value: 50,
100 or 150 meters. The circle, instead of an ellipse, is used
here for simplifying the analysis and interpretability of the
localization traces.
Figure 8 illustrates the accuracy of the collective mea-
surements for each group and test user. The estimates of the
average transport sustainability that each test user receives
approximate well the actual values. Note that users with
higher localization radius receive aggregate estimates earlier
and they have a larger9 time span during which the receive
collective measurements.
Table 2 shows the choices of transport means made by
each test user at each point of interest. Overall, none of the
more unsustainable transport means, i.e. car, bus and train,
are chosen by test users to visit the points of interest. Walk-
ing and tram are the most popular means given that ETH
Zurich and the main train station are very well connected
with tram and are in close proximity with each other. The
mean sustainability of 4.17 for ETH Zurich Hauptgebaüde
is slightly higher than the one of 3.8 at Zurich Hauptbahn-
hof.
9Localization circles with lower size in which test users do not remain
for enough time may result in missing the receipt of collective measure-
ments as observed in the second group at the Zurich Hauptbahnhof point of
interest.
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Figure 8: Accuracy of real-time collective measurements dur-
ing the testnet scenario on 3.6.2019 between 13:00 and 14:00
for 6 users split in 2 groups. The aggregation function cal-
culated is the average transport sustainability among all test
users localized in one of the two point of interests of Zurich
Hauptbahnhof and ETH Zurich Hauptgebaüde.
Table 2
Transport sustainability responses for the two points of inter-
est.
Group Test User Zurich Hauptbahnhof ETH Zurich Hauptgebaüde
1 1 5. Walking 3. Tram
1 2 3. Tram 5. Walking
1 3 5. Walking 5. Walking
2 1 3. Tram 4. Bike
2 2 3. Tram 5. Walking
2 3 4. Bike 3. Tram
Mean: 3.8 4.17
7.2. Witness presence for cycling safety
The cycling accident risk of the route in Figure 9b is stud-
ied that consist of four urban spots in Zurich. The risk esti-
mation of this route is derived by a continuous spatial risk es-
timationmodel of the Zurich area that uses kernel density es-
timation with input the road network, geolocated accidents,
their severity, and insurance compensation information [49].
The exact design of the model is out of the scope of this pa-
per and the estimated risk values are used here as a baseline
for comparison. In particular, this route is chosen for its ex-
treme risk gradient observed around its circumference, with
high risk at the top of the route and relative low/medium risk
elsewhere as shown in Figure 9a. The actual risk values of
the four urban spots are depicted in Figure 9b, while Fig-
ure 9c, 9d, 9e and 9f illustrate images from the four spots.
Note that each risk value of the urban spots is the mean risk
value of the road section leading to this spot.
The sequence of the actual cycling risk values across
the four urban spots is the baseline for comparison to the
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peaks despite similar accident rates, i.e. the ratio of fˆAs,T (x)/fˆT (x) from Equation 1,
for these areas. Non-normalized and normalized density contours are compared in
Figure 4a and 4b. The contour peaks of the latter are less extreme than those in Figure
4a, while the dominant peaks remain in the same locations and distinguishable in
both versions, suggesting that normalization has scaled the risk measurement of high
traffic regions as desired. The similar placement of peaks suggests that the potential
imprecision in OSM data has not drastically changed the patterns in the bike accident
data.
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Figure 4: Density contours and interpolated network risk in Zu¨rich. Orange hue de-
notes higher risk.
Note that the estimation window in Figure 3 extends beyond the specified studied
region. Density estimation has highly variable boundary behavior due to the abrupt
exclusion of points at the window edges. This boundary effect, further exacerbated by
taking the ratio of densities estimated over the window, results in spuriously peaked
boundary estimates of fAs|T (x). An extended window is introduced to estimate the
densities, before restricting back and normalizing to the studied region.
At the final stage, fR(x) is mapped to the street network using simple linear in-
terpolation. The resulting normalized risk is plotted on a map of Zu¨rich using the
ggmap [8] and ggplot2 [18] packages in R. The interpolated risks on the street
network are displayed in Figure 4c.
Immediately apparent is the relatively high risk in two vibrantly orange areas
near Hardbru¨cke15 and Langstrasse16. These areas are, by a wide margin, the most
dangerous in Zu¨rich and the magnitude of their risk makes visual risk inspection of
the rest of Zu¨rich challenging. A Box-Cox power transformation [5] with an exponent
of 12 is applied to the data as shown in Figure 4d. The variation in risk is more visually
apparent and so it is easier to distinguish higher and lower risk areas.
The risk estimation method illustrated in this paper relies on the quality of the
reported accident data. However, it is likely that accidents are under-reported to po-
lice, especially those that do not result in injuries or property damage. The following
reasoning is made about these unreported accidents: (i) As unreported accidents are
expected to be of light severity, they are not expected to significantly increase the
estimated risk values. Moreover, cyclists are likely more interested in those accidents
15 Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardbrcke (last accessed: May 2019).
16 Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langstrasse (last accessed: May 2019).
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Note that the estimation window in Figure 3 extends beyond the specified studied
region. Density estimation has highly variable boundary behavior due to the abrupt
exclusion of points at the window edges. This boundary effect, further exacerbated by
taking the ratio of densities estimated over the window, results in spuriously peaked
boundary estimates of fAs|T (x). An extended window is introduced to estimate the
densities, before restricting back and normalizing to the studied region.
At the final stage, fR(x) is mapped to the street network using simple linear in-
terpolation. The resulting normalized risk is plotted on a map of Zu¨rich using the
ggmap [8] and ggplot2 [18] packages in R. The interpolated risks on the street
network are displayed in Figure 4c.
Immediately apparent is the relatively high risk in two vibrantly orange areas
near Hardbru¨cke15 and Langstrasse16. These areas are, by a wide margin, the most
dangerous in Zu¨rich and the magnitude of their risk makes visual risk inspection of
the rest of Zu¨rich challenging. A Box-Cox power transformation [5] with an exponent
of 12 is applied to the data as shown in Figure 4d. The variation in risk is more visually
apparent and so it is easier to distinguish higher and lower risk areas.
The risk estimation method illustrated in this paper relies on the quality of the
reported accident data. However, it is likely that accidents are under-reported to po-
lice, especially those that do not result in injuries or property damage. The following
reasoning is made about these unreported accidents: (i) As unreported accidents are
expected to be of light severity, they are not expected to significantly increase the
estimated risk values. Moreover, cyclists are likely more interested in those accidents
15 Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardbrcke (last accessed: May 2019).
16 Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langstrasse (last accessed: May 2019).
(a) Selected route from the risk map es-
timated from officially reported accident
data [49].
(b) Cycling route and
the risk in four urban
spots.
(c) Spot A with
risk value of
1.36.
(d) Spot B with
risk val e of
0.42.
(e) Spot C with
risk value of
6.21.
(f) Spot D with
risk value of
8.31.
Figure 9: The setup for crowd-s nsi g cycling safety. The
empirical cycling risk values derived from the Federal Roads
Office official data of Swiss GeoAdmin [49] are compared to
the risk values collected by citizens’ witness presence.
perceived cycling risk estimated via the Smart Agora plat-
form. For this purpose, a crowd-sensing asset is designed
with Smart Agora using the sequential navigational modal-
ity with the same four urban pots of Figure 9b as points of
int est. The cycling risk of the road section from the earlier
to the next urban spot is assessed when the test cycling user
is localized at the next spot, where a likert scale question
pops up in the Smart Agora app evaluating cycling risk at a
linear scale between 1. very safe to 5. very dangerous. An-
swering the questions in all spots completes the cycling trip
of a test user and results in a sequence of perceived risk val-
ues to compare to the sequence of actual cycling risk values.
This comparison is made using both Pearson and Spearman
correlation [119] for both a numerical and ordinal match-
ing assessment between the two sequences of cycling risk
values. Pearson correlation is a measure of linear depen-
dence, i.e. a maximum value of 1 between two sequences of
values indicates a perfect linear relationship. However, the
actual cycling risk values derived via Gaussian kernel densi-
ties [49] denote measurements of a non-linear nature. There-
fore, the Spearman correlation is used to measure monotonic
relationships on the ranking of the cycling risk values.
Table 3 compares the perceived cycling risk values from
11 test users to the actual baseline cycling risk values. All
test users cycled over the route on 12.12.2018 around 15:00
with the same provided bike to minimize biases originated
from weather, light condition and the condition of different
bikes. Correlation values are calculated using the mean and
median value of the perceived cycling risk for each urban
spot across all users. The Pearson correlation is 0.94 and
0.85 for the mean and median respectively, while the Spear-
man correlation is 1.0 for both mean and median.
Although the number of test users and urban spots is low
to reach strong conclusions, the high matching of the two cy-
cling risk estimations in all presented measures suggests that
the empirical evidence of cycling accidents matches well
with the risk that citizens witness. Therefore, a crowd-based
witness presence has a strong potential to verify the status of
an urban space and as a result reason about public spacemore
evidently. As an implication, policies designed based on ev-
idence stemming from witness presence promise higher le-
gitimacy for citizens.
8. Discussion
This section discusses dynamic consensus for proving
witness presence as well as the role of self-governance and
artificial intelligence in the augmented democracy paradigm.
8.1. Dynamic consensus and self-governance
Proof of witness presence can be validated in a private
(permissioned) or public (permissionless) network of nodes
running the consensus. For instance, a legally binding deci-
sion-making process run by city authorities may require a
private network of legally representative nodes, similarly to
poll clerks in general elections. In case of democratic institu-
tions that may not be well-established, a public network can
be a better fit for open self-governed communities encourag-
ing active participation. Moreover, meeting consensus per-
formance requirements using public networks requires ac-
cess to high-performing public clouds federated by commu-
nities or crowd-sourced computational resources deployed
by citizens in large-scale.
An adjustable consensus cost by blockchain platforms [117]
involves trade-offs between transaction value vs. risk and
speed vs. cost. For instance, when performing collective
measurements such as the ones in Section 7.1, citizens choices
do not all have the same influence on the aggregation accu-
racy, e.g. the difference from the mean determines the influ-
ence. Therefore, witness presence claims can be prioritized
based on the influence of citizens’ choices on the collective
measurements. As a result, accurate estimates are faster with
lower transaction costs. Such costs can be further decreased
by relaxing the verification rules of the smart contracts exe-
cuting the proofs of witness presence according to the influ-
ence of citizens’ choices on the aggregation accuracy. In the
application scenario of cycling risk maps (Sectionl 7.2), op-
timum cycling risk threasholds can be derived to decrease
the transaction costs of witness presence (relaxed verifica-
tion rules) for citizens cycling in risky areas for accidents.
Such adjustments can be made within community do-
mains that determine validation rules, the number of con-
sensus voters as well as policies/regulations for smart con-
tract execution and data, e.g. General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (GDPR). Such domains can also also be used for the
self-governance of the augmented democracy paradigmwith
blockchain providing an efficient and effective automated
dispute resolution: reaching consensus on the design of a
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Table 3
Perceived cycling risk acquired via the Smart Agora app vs. the actual cycling risk calcu-
lated via an empirical model of real-world data [49] in the four urban spots of Figure 9.
Users’ responses are in the range [1, 5] with 1 for very safe and 5 for very dangerous.
Locations Test users: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Mean Median Actual cycling risk [49]
Spot A 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1.55 2 1.36
Spot B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1.09 1 0.42
Spot C 2 1 1 1 2 3 1 3 4 2 2 2.0 2 6.21
Spot D 3 3 3 2 4 4 2 2 3 4 4 3.09 3 8.31
Pearson correlation: 0.94 0.85
Spearman correlation: 1.0 1.0
decision-making process, i.e. navigation modality and col-
lective measurements maps.
8.2. The role of artificial intelligence
Decision support systems such as digital assistants run
by artificial intelligence can make decision-making more in-
formed and efficient by overcoming the humans’ limitations
in congitive bandwidth and the barier of expertise knowl-
edge required to reason about a citizen’s choice. However,
machine learning algorithms often require sensitive personal
data to operate and can be used to nudge citizens and un-
dermine democracy [66]. For instance, the spread of fake
news in social media can influence results of elections and
therefore massive manipulation of democratic processes is
possible using intelligent algorithms [37]. This paper dis-
tinguishes two socially responsible and ethically aligned ap-
plicability scenarios of artificial intelligence in the proposed
augmented democracy paradigm: (i) local intelligence and
(ii) collective intelligence.
Local intelligence concerns the use of open-source ma-
chine learning algorithms that run locally at personal de-
vices of citizens. These algorithms make use of localized
or remote open data and they can be used to assist citizens
in reaching complex decisions. For instance, a distributed
content-based recommender algorithm for more sustainable
grocery product choices can make use of public product data
related to sustainability. Representationmodels of these prod-
uct data can be computed by official authorities and envi-
ronmental organizations before transferred to citizens’ smart
phone for personalization [67]. The limitation of local in-
telligence is that it assists decisions taken from an individ-
ual’s perspective and it cannot address complex coordination
problems that involve several citizens.
Collective intelligence can address such coordination prob-
lems, though the challenge of privacy and transparency re-
mains subject of active research. The concept of federated
learning is a promising approach for supervised machine
learning algorithms and is based on the concept “bring the
code to the data, instead of the data to the code" [46, 87]. The
concept of collective learning is introduced for solving NP
hard combinatorial optimization problems in a fully decen-
tralizated fashion given citizens’ constraints on privacy and
autonomy [103]. In the augmented democracy paradigm,
collective learning can address tragedy of the commons prob-
lems in which citizens’ choices need to satisfy both individ-
ual and collective objectives. Collective learning has been
applied10 to application scenarios of sharing economies, e.g.
reducing demand power peaks, load-balancing of bike shar-
ing stations, charging control of electric vehicles, traffic flow
optimization and other.
9. Conclusion and Future Work
This paper concludes that the proposed augmented democ-
racy paradigm is a promising endeavor for building sustain-
able and participatory Smart Cities. A holistic approach for
augmented democracy is introduced based on three pillars
that cover participatory crowd-sensing, proof ofwitness pres-
ence and real-time collective measurements. Smart Agora
can model a broad spectrum of collective decision-making
scenarios given the different types of collected data and nav-
igational modalities. Proving witness presence becomes a
cornerstone to a more informed and responsible decision-
making. The cycling safety use case scenario illustrated in
this paper confirms the accurate information acquired via
wisdom of the crowd. Moreover, witness presence has the
potential to cultivate high level of engagement and partic-
ipation integrated in the citizens’ daily life and the public
space they belong. Linking real-time collective measure-
ments to witness presence provides an added value to crowd-
sourced data analytics made by citizens, for citizens. This
paper shows how blockchain consensus and crypto-economic
design can realize such a grand vision by validating location
proofs and incentivizing physical presence. Several local-
ization approaches are reviewed. An experimental testnet
scenario is designed and launched to provide a first techni-
cal proof of concept of the proposed augmented democracy
paradigm.
Future work focuses on addressing the limitations of this
work. These includes the expansion of the testnet scenario
with smart contracts running in the blockchain and provid-
ing more advanced and secure proofs of witness presence,
beyond GPS and by composing complex social proofs. The
10EPOS, theEconomic Planning andOptimized Selections is the project
studying collective learning [13].
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influence of mobility patterns and infrastructure on trans-
action costs and latency requires a further dedicated study.
Relying on token curated registries, for instance the ones of
FOAM [30], for the participation of test users is also subject
of future work. Moreover, further use cases in conjunction
with city authorities and local communities are required to
assess what navigational modalities and collective measure-
ments maps find applicability in real-world. The role of self-
governance and an ethically aligned artificial intelligence are
expected to play a key role in realizing augmented democ-
racy at large-scale.
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A. Mobility Traces
Figure 10 shows the localization traces of the test users
for different localization radius.
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